We evaluate the added value of a forecast service that can provide probabilistic predictions for adverse weather events for two differentiated seasons, corresponding to the same productive cycle. The paper builds on a cost-loss dynamic model, by considering the role of forecasting systems in the decision making process. We present the analytical solution for this problem which is consistent with the numerical results in the literature. However, we prove that there is a range of regions for the optimal policy depending on the cost of crop protection, the avoided loss and the quality of the information available. Finally, we illustrate the results with a numerical example.
Introduction
Great concern exists about the increase in adverse climate events and their consequences for society and the economy (IPCC, 2007) . Agriculture is one of the most affected economic sectors suffering each year high losses due to meteorological changes (Ciscar et al., 2011; Battisti and Naylor, 2009; Olesen and Bindi, 2002) and water conflicts, especially in the Mediterranean region (Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004; Iglesias et al., 2009) . Nevertheless, improved farming management can largely cope with the climate risks and so crop production is one of the activities with the highest adaptive capacity to climate change effects (EU COM, 2009) .
Adaptation policies on a global scale are essential to cope with the potential losses, but the development of private adaptation strategies based on improved management is also crucial (Brouwer et al., 2004) . For this kind of adaptation measures, meteorological information can play an important role if it assists the improvement of management decisions. Nowadays, a number of high quality seasonal forecasts and weather forecasts are available leading to significant applications in agricultural management. This is more so since a correlation between ENSO (El Niño/Southern Oscillation) and rainfall and temperature patterns is being widely analysed.
In this paper we analyse the economic value of information on adverse climate events that some forecasting service is giving in advance with differentiated probabilistic predictions. We consider two time periods, corresponding to the same productive cycle, and evaluate the optimal decision making about protective actions to avoid potential losses. Then we analyse how the information improves the decision making process.
Dynamic treatment is essential for this kind of risk management problems. When farmers decide about protecting harvests from a meteorological risk, they do not obtain immediate results, since the decision taken over every period influences the total results. To take no protective action in one period is enough to risk losing the overall harvest if the adverse weather event occurs. For example, frost protection is just one phase of an orchard management process, but if the crop is lost due to frost, the decisions pertinent to orchard operation for the rest of the time horizon under consideration may have limited or no effect on current year production (Cerdá and Quiroga, 2011) .
The cost-loss model has been widely used to analyse this kind of management problem (Katz and Murphy, 1997; Cerdá and Quiroga, 2010; Wilks, 1997; Palmer, 2002) , and several examples with numerical results have been presented for a farmer's protection in a dynamic framework (Katz, 1993; Meza et al., 2003; Katz and Ehrendorfer, 2006) . Analytical results for the optimal policy of the dynamic model for the case of climatological information have been calculated in Cerdá and Quiroga (2011) . This paper builds on this dynamic model considering the role of forecasting systems in the decision making process.
The structure of the decision making problem is as follows: (i) the farmer can decide to protect or not to protect in each of the two periods, (ii) adverse meteorological events can occur in either of the two periods considered (corresponding to the same productive cycle) and they can cause crop losses if the protective action has not been taken, (iii) the farmer makes the decision about protection in each of the two periods before knowing if severe weather is coming, (iv) the information available is of two types. One kind of information is the climatological information, based on historical records of climate variables (ie. the statistical probability of drought for the considered region). We consider that this is always available and known for the farmer´s community. Another type of information is the weather forecast or seasonal forecast information. This forecast system is considered as a kind of early warning system that allows the farmer to have improved information about the probability of severe events. This paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the model structure and equations. Analytical solutions are obtained in Section 3, while in Section 4 an illustrative numerical example is developed. Finally some conclusions are presented in Section 5.
The model
The model involves two possible actions, to protect (α = 1), or not to protect (α = 0), and two possible events, adverse weather (θ = 1) and no adverse weather (θ = 0). If protective action is taken, the farmer is assumed to incur a cost, C > 0 that we consider a proportion of the avoided loss, C = γ L where 0 < γ < 1. A loss L > 0 is suffered by the farmer if protective action is not taken and severe adverse weather occurs. There is no cost or loss, otherwise. The type of protection could avoid the physical loss (i.e. by applying protective technology to some plants) or just provide an economic compensation (i.e. purchasing insurance for part of the crop). We consider the common assumptions of the familiar prototype problem usually referred to as the cost-loss ratio situation (Katz and Murphy, 1997; Katz, 1993) and a summary of the model variables and parameters is presented in Table 1 . When only the climatological information is available, the optimization problem to minimize the expected expenses deriving from the adverse weather event (i.e. severe drought) in the two periods can be written as follows:
[1] θ 1 and θ 2 are independent random variables and take the value 1 with probability P θ and the value 0 with probability 1-P θ .
L 1 is predetermined as L, L 2 {L,0} and L 3 {L,0}. This is a stochastic, dynamic optimization problem of two time periods in discrete time, which will be solved using the method of Dynamic Programming. In this problem, L i = (i = 1, 2, 3) is the state variable and α i (i = 1, 2) is the control variable. The sequence in which the state variable, the control variable and also the stochastic component of the problem θ i (i = 1, 2) appear, is represented in Figure 1 . This sequence is very helpful for the understanding of the problem and also for the calculation of the optimal solution, using the Bellman equations. In the case of counting on an information system for weather forecasting or seasonal forecasting, the farmer's decision making can be potentially improved, so we want to analyze the optimal policy also in this case. As in Murphy et al. (1985) , we consider the incorporation of additional information to the model which is introduced as an imperfect weather or seasonal forecasting from a meteorological office. It is assumed that the farmer receives an imperfect forecast about the state of nature at the beginning of each of the two periods. For i {1,2}, this information is represented by the variable Z i which indicates a forecast of adverse weather (Z i = 1), or of nonadverse weather (Z i = 0). The conditional probabilities of adverse weather are denoted by P 1 = Pr {θ i = 1 / Z i = 1} and P 0 = Pr {θ i = 1 / Z i = 1}. In addition, as in Murphy et al. (1985) it is assumed that Pr {Z i = 1}= Pr {θ i = 1}=P θ , that is, the forecasting system produces adverse weather signals with the same probability that adverse weather events take place. As Katz and Murhy (1997: 187-188) explain, concerning this assumption, "It is assumed that forecasts of adverse weather are issued with the same long-run relative frequency as the occurrence of adverse weather (termed "overall reliability" or "unconditionally unbiased") . This requirement is equivalent to constraining the conditional probability P 0 to move from P θ toward zero at the same relative rate at which the conditional probability P 1 moves from P θ toward one".
Without loss of generality, 0 ≤ P 0 ≤ P θ ≤ P 1 ≤, is also assumed. In these conditions it is easily obtained 1 that
The decision making problem for the two periods can be expressed as the following stochastic, dynamic optimization problem:
where Z i is a random variable that can take the values 1 or 0 with the following associated probabilities: .
θ i is also a random variable that can take the values 1 or 0 with the following associated probabilities depending on the forecast value:
As before, we assume that θ 1 y θ 2 are independent random variables. Source: Own work.
Results
In this section the two cases, climatological information and additional information consisting of imperfect weather or seasonal forecasting from a meteorological office, are studied independently.
Optimal policy when only climatological information is available
Proposition 1 shows the optimal policy for the farmer when only climatological information is available, that is when the farmer knows about the historical probability but does not possess a forecast system.
Proposition 1
In the optimization problem [1], corresponding to the case of climatological information 2 :
i) If the optimal decision is α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 1 that is to protect in both periods. In this case, the minimum expense is:
ii) If , the optimal decision is α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 1. That is to protect in the second period and not to protect in the first period. The optimal expense in this case is: .
iii) If γ ≥ P 0 , the optimal decision is α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 1, so it is optimal not to protect in each of the periods. The optimal level of expense in this case is: . The proof is in the Annex.
Comparison with the static case:
In the static case (one period), the optimal policy when only climatological information is available is the following: to protect if γ < P 0 , and not to protect if γ ≥ P 0 . That is, if the cost of protection is high it is better not to protect and if that cost is low it is better to protect, P 0 being the threshold which separates both possibilities.
The optimal policy obtained in the two-period case is less protective than that corresponding to the static case. When the condition for no protection in the static case holds (γ ≥ P 0 ), it is optimal not to protect in each of the two periods in the dynamic case. However the protective situation in the static model (γ < P 0 ) is decomposed in two cases in the dynamic model: to protect in each of the two periods if the cost of protection is very low and not to protect in the first period but protect in the second one if the cost of protection takes some intermediate value
Optimal policy when meteorological information is available
In this subsection the situation in which additional meteorological information is introduced is analysed. The optimal policy and the corresponding minimum expense for each possibility are obtained and stated in Proposition 2.
Different mathematical expressions for the optimal policy appear depending on or . Therefore the optimal policy is obtained for each of the two cases. As P 0 ≤ P 1 , it is possible that (for example for P 0 = 0.4 and P 1 = 0.75) and it is also possible that (for example for P 0 = 0.4 and P 1 = 0.6).
As , the higher the value of P 1 , the higher the value of
On the other hand, as the higher the value of P 1 , the lower the value of P 0 . Therefore, if P 1 is high (which means that the weather forecast or the seasonal forecast system is good), the condition will hold.
Proposition 2 (A) Let us assume that (high quality of the meteorological information).
The optimal policy for the minimization problem in [2] is 3 : The proof is in the Annex.
Comparison with the static case:
In the static case (one period), the optimal policy when meteorological information is available is the following: to protect if γ < P 0 to protect when Z = 1 but not to protect when Z = 0 if P 0 ≤ γ < P 1 , and not to protect if γ ≥ P 1 . Therefore, if the cost of protection is low it is better to protect, if that cost is high it is better not to protect, and if it takes an intermediate value the corresponding optimal decision has to be taken depending on the specific forecast.
Again, as in the case of only climatological information, the optimal policy obtained in the two-period case is less protective than that corresponding to the static case:
• When the condition for unconditional no protection in the static case holds it is optimal not to protect in each of the two periods in the dynamic case.
• When the parameter γ takes an intermediate value (P 0 ≤ γ < P 1 ) and the meteorological information is of high quality (case A), the optimal policy to apply is the one obtained in the static case in each of both periods if but the optimal policy is not to protect in the first period and to apply the optimal policy corresponding to the static case only in the second period is
• When the parameter γ takes that intermediate value (P 0 ≤ γ < P 1 ) but the meteorological information is of low quality (case B), the optimal policy is not to protect in the first period and to protect in the second period only if a forecast of adverse weather has been received for that period (that is, the optimal policy corresponding to the static case, only in the second period).
• The protective situation in the static model (γ < P 0 ) is divided in two cases in the dynamic model (A): to protect in each of the two periods if the cost of protection is very low and to protect in the second period but to protect in the first period only if a forecast of adverse weather has been received for that period.
• That protective situation in the static model (γ < P 0 ) is divided in three cases in the dynamic model (B): to protect in each of the two periods if the cost of protection is very low , to protect in the second period but to protect in the first period only if a forecast of adverse weather has been received for that period if and not to protect in the first period but to protect in the second period if
Economic value of the forecast information
The economic value of the forecast information is defined (Katz and Murphy, 1997) The minimum expected expense (without forecasting) corresponds to the value of in Proposition 1, and depends on the parameters γ and P θ . The minimum expected expense (with forecasting) corresponds to the value of in Proposition 2, and depends on the parameters γ, P 0 , P 1 and P θ . As in Section 2 it has been obtained that this optimal expense can be written as a function of the parameters γ, P 1 and P θ . Therefore, for γ and L given, the value of information can be written as a function of P 1 and P θ . In order to write the value of information as a function of a unique va- If we compare the structure of the optimal policies corresponding to the cases without forecasting (Proposition 1) and with forecasting (Proposition 2), we observe that there is an improvement in the decision, and therefore the economic value of the information is positive, in the case in which holds (except when in the case of low quality of the forecast system), because in this interval the decision is dependent on the value predicted for Z, that is the forecast system result. Moreover in this case the value of given by Proposition 1 is different from the corresponding value of obtained in Proposition 2. In this situation, since the farmer's optimal decision depends on the meteorological information received, this information has a positive value in being able to improve the decision making process. This value will be derived from the difference between the optimal expected expense with climatological information and forecasting systems respectively available.
However, there are three situations in which the forecast information has no effect on the farmer's decision making: (i) When γ > P 1 , the optimal decision is the same as in the case of climatological information, the farmer should not protect the harvest in either of the two time periods whatever the forecast received, and therefore the information value is zero in this case. The optimal expected expense given by Proposition 1 is identical to the corresponding expense obtained in Proposition 2:
This does not depend on the quality of the information, so for this kind of situation improvements in the weather forecast systems will not revert in an increasing value of the information given. (ii) When , the cost for the protection action is so low that the optimal decision will be to protect whatever the information received. The information value is therefore again zero, since the forecast does not change the decision of the farmer. In this case, in both propositions 1 and 2. (iii) When in case (B) of low quality of the meteorological information. Observing the optimal policy when meteorological information is available when γ varies from 0 to 1 we see a transition from unconditional protection in both periods (for low values of γ) to different forms of conditional protection (for intermediate values of γ) to unconditional no protection in both periods (for high values of γ). In the case of low quality of the weather forecast system, if it is optimal not to protect in the first period (instead of conditional protection) and to protect in the second period (Proposition 2, (B)). In this case, in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we have that Therefore in this particular case, the forecast is not used and the economic value of the information is zero because the difference between the minimum expected expense without forecasting and the corresponding expense with forecasting is zero.
A numerical example
In this section we obtain the optimal policy and the corresponding optimal value of the objective function for different values of the parameters. First we consider the case in which only climatological information is available and in the second subsection we study the case when weather or seasonal forecast information is also available.
Only climatological information is available
Let us assume that L = 1 (the amount of harvest available at the beginning of the time horizon is normalized to 1). As C = γ L we have then that C = γ. Table 2 summarizes the potential results for the two strategies available in each period. 
Source: Own work.
The optimal strategies and the corresponding optimal expected expenditures for different values of γ (γ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7}) and different values of P θ (P θ {0.15, 0.30, 0.45, 0.60, 0.75}) are presented in Table 3.   TABLE 3 Optimal strategies (P: Protect, N: Not to Protect) and optimal expected expenditures (in brackets) for different values of the cost of protection (γ) and the probability of adverse weather (P θ ) As can be seen in Table 3 , for a fixed value of P θ , the higher the cost of protection (higher value of γ), the lower the level of protection. On the other hand, for a fixed value of γ (a given cost of protection), the higher the probability of adverse weather, the higher the level of protection. As has been proved in Section 3, it is never optimal to protect in the first period and not to protect in the second period. In Table 3 we can also see that whenever the cost of protection (γ) is higher than or equal to the probability of adverse weather (P θ ), the optimal strategy is not to protect in any of the periods.
Meteorological information is available
In this subsection, the optimal expected expenses, when weather forecast information is available, are obtained, applying Proposition 2, for different values of the cost of protection, as a function of the quality of the information, for a given value of P θ . Also, the corresponding economic values of the forecast information introduced in Section 3 are obtained.
Here, as in the previous case, it is assumed that L = 1. Therefore, we have that C = γ is the cost of protection, with 0 < γ < 1. All the numerical results are obtained for the case in which P θ = 0.45. Figure 3 contains the optimal expected expenses for different values of the parameter γ, as a function of the quality of the information q, for P θ = 0.45. The optimal expected expenses are obtained for these particular numerical values of the parameters, applying Proposition 2, where each of the optimal expected expenses, in general also depends on P 0 and P 1 .
As
(see footnote 1), each of the optimal expected expenses, for these particular values of the parameters, can be written as a function of P 1. On the other hand, in Section 3 the quality of the information has been defined as Therefore, for P θ = 0.45 , we have that P 1 = 0.55q + 0.45, and the optimal expected expenses obtained in Proposition 2 can be expressed as a function of q, where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. The meaning of the variable q is more intuitive than of the variable P 1 .
The following conclusions can be obtained from Figure 3: • The higher the cost of protection (γ), the higher the optimal expected expense.
• For whatever γ fixed, the optimal expected expense decreases when the quality of the information increases.
• The rate of decrease of the optimal expected expense is higher when the quality of the information is higher. Figure 4 contains the economic value of the forecast information V(q), introduced in Section 3, for L=1 and P θ = 0.45, for different values of γ, as a function of the quality of the information q. For the calculation of V(q), the optimal expected expenses obtained from Proposition 2 to represent Figure 3 , and also the corresponding expenses, for the case of climatological information, obtained from Proposition 1, are needed. • For whatever γ given, the economic value of the forecast information V γ (q) is a non-decreasing function of the quality of the forecast information q.
• For whatever γ given, there exists q * γ with 0 < q * γ < 1, such that the form of the function V γ (q) is the following:
where W γ (q) is strictly increasing and also linear or piecewise linear.
• When the quality of the forecast information is very low, the forecast information has no economic value. When the quality of the forecast information is high, the forecast information has high economic value.
• Initially, for low values of the cost of protection γ, the economic value of the forecast information is higher when the cost of protection is higher, up to a certain level (γ = 0.3 in this case). Beyond that level, the economic value of the forecast information is lower when the cost of protection is higher.
Conclusions
This paper develops analytical solutions for a dynamic cost-loss problem considering farmer's decisions about protection against adverse weather events through two different periods. We prove that several regions exist in the optimal policy depending on the cost for crop protection, the avoided loss and the quality of the information available. The optimal expected expense has been calculated for each of the regions and the economic value of forecast systems has been discussed. This value is derived from the difference between the optimal expected expense with climatological information and forecasting systems respectively available. The information value depends on the information quality, being zero below a quality threshold and taking positive values from this threshold and the value increasing with the information quality q. However, there are three situations in which the forecast information has no effect on the farmer's decision making: (i) the cost for protection being relatively high with respect to the probability of suffering a potential loss, because the farmer will not protect the harvest in either of the two seasons whatever the forecast received, and therefore the information value is zero. (ii) In the case of the cost for the protection action being so low that the optimal decision will be to protect whatever the information received. (iii) When in the case of low quality of the weather forecast system. For these three cases, the information value is therefore zero, since the forecast does not change the decision of the farmer. This does not depend on the quality of the information, so for this kind of situations, improvements for the weather or seasonal forecast systems will not revert in an increasing value of the information given. Finally, a numerical example is presented in order to illustrate all the previous results. The optimal decision of the farmer and the corresponding mi-nimum expected expense are obtained for different specific values of the parameters. The case in which only climatological information is available and also the case in which weather or seasonal forecasts are also available are analized. In this last case, the economic value of the meteorological information is also studied. Interesting conclusions are obtained and presented for this numerical result, in Section 4.
Annex: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1:
Using the Dynamic Programming method for two periods, we start the analysis when the second period has finished.
End of the time horizon: L 3 being determined, with no contribution to the objective function: J 3 * {L 3 } = 0. 
So the contingent decision for the second period would be: α 2 (0): Whatever (The decision in the second period is nonsense since in this case the crop was lost in the first period).
That is, if the crop has suffered no damage by the beginning of the second period, the optimal decision depends on the cost-loss ratio. If the cost-loss ratio is higher (lower) than the probability of suffering the loss, then the better option is not to protect (protect). This decision should be the same if the farmer has to decide in just one period (the decision being static). If the crop was lost in the first period, the decision in the second period is irrelevant.
First period: L 1 determined and equal to L. The Bellman equation corresponding to the first period will be: , which considering the expected value will become: . Therefore: If α 1 = 0, the expected value will be P θ L + (1-P θ ) Min {γL, P θ L}. If α 1 = 1, the expected value will be γL + Min {γL, P θ L}.
So, the farmer should protect in the first period if:
If γ < P θ to protect will be optimal if P θ -P θ γ > γ γ < .
Therefore, in this case the farmer will protect in both seasons, α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 1 , if , the expected expense is J 1 * {L} = 2γL.
And it will protect just in the second season, that is α 1 = 0 and α 2 = 1 if
It will never be optimal to protect in the first season and not to protect in the second, that is, α 1 = 1 and α 2 = 0, since it is impossible to satisfy and γ ≥ P θ simultaneously.
If γ ≥ P θ , to protect will be optimal if P θ -P θ 2 > γ, which is impossible, because
So, in this case, the farmer will not protect either in the first season or in the second, α 1 = 0 and α 2 = 0, and the expected expense will be
Proof of Proposition 2:
Using the Dynamic Programming method for two periods, we start the analysis when the second period has finished. If Z 2 = 1, taking the expected value, we obtain so α * 2 = 1 γL 2 ≤ P 1 L 2 γ ≤ P 1 . Therefore:
• If γ < P 1 α * 2 = 1 and J 2 * {L 2 ,1} = γL 2 .
• If γ > P 1 α * 2 = 0 and J 2 * {L 2 ,1} = P 1 L 2 .
• If γ = P 1 , both options are indifferent for the farmer.
In general, J 2 * {L 2 ,1} = Min{ γL 2 ,P 1 L 2 }. If Z 2 = 0, taking the expected value, we obtain:
= 1 and J 2 * {L 2 ,0} = γL 2 .
• If γ > P 0 α * 2 = 0 and J 2 * {L 2 ,0} = P 0 L 2 .
• If γ = P 0 , both options are indifferent for the farmer.
Now if we consider L 2 given but Z 2 still not known, the optimal value can be expressed by:
And the optimal contingent plan will be:
• If γ < P 0 , then α * 2 = 1, whatever the value predicted for Z 2 .
• If P 0 ≤ γ < P 1 , then .
• If γ ≥ P 1 , then α * 2 = 0, whatever the value predicted for Z 2 .
Therefore:
Since L 2 can take the values 0 or L, we have that: That is also the optimal policy for the static case (just one period).
First period:
With L 1 = L and Z 1 known, the Bellman equation corresponding to the first period will be We solve the problem for the two possible values of the forecast Z 1 = 1 and Z 1 = 0. If Z 1 = 1, taking the expected value, we obtain Substituting the value for α 1 we have the following possibilities for the objective function:
• If α 1 = 1, the objective function is: γL + J 2 * {L}.
• If α 1 = 0, the objective function is: P 1 L + J 2 * {(1 -P 1 )L}. Since in the second period we obtained three possible optimal options depending on the value of γ, in order to determine the joint optimal policy for the two considered periods we have to analyse for the first period each of the three possibilities which appeared in the second period: a) In the case of γ < P 0 , we have:
If α 1 = 1, the objective function is: γL + γL = 2 γL.
If α 1 = 0, the objective function is:
Therefore the optimal decision will be α
• If .
In general, J 1 * {L, 1} = Min {2 γL, P 1 L + γL -γP 1 L}. Therefore, distinguishing between the two cases considered in the statement of the Proposition, we have:
• Assuming that • Assuming that b) In the case of P 0 ≤ γ < P 1 , we have:
If α 1 = 1, the objective function is: γL + P θ γL + (1 -P θ ) P 0 L If α 1 = 0, the objective function is: P 1 L + P θ γ (1 -P 1 ) L + (1 -P θ ) P θ (1 -P 1 ) L, And therefore, the optimal decision will be: In general for this case, we obtain:
we can distinguish between the two cases considered in the statement of Proposition 2, in the following way:
• Assuming that
• Assuming that c) In the case of γ ≥ P 1 , we have:
If α 1 = 1, the objective function is:
, and the optimal policy will be: but this cannot occur if γ ≥ P 1 , therefore in both cases A and B,
-If γ ≥ P 1 it is α * 1 = 0 and
If Z 1 = 0, taking the expected value we obtain the following expression for the optimal expense: and substituting the value for α 1 we have the following possibilities for the objective function:
• If α 1 = 0, the objective function is: P 0 L + J 2 * {(1 -P 0 )L}.
Again we consider the three possible options in the second period: a) In the case of γ < P 0 , we have:
• If α 1 = 1, the objective function is: γL + γL = 2 γL.
• If α 1 = 0, the objective function is:
So, the optimal policy will be:
In general, Therefore, for both cases (A) and (B) we have, b) In the case of P 0 ≤ γ < P 1 , we have:
• If α 1 = 1, the objective function is: γL + P θ γL + (1 -P θ )P 0 L.
• If α 1 = 0, the objective function is: P 0 L + P θ γ (1 -P 0 ) L + (1 -P θ ) P 0 (1 -P 0 )L.
but it is impossible since γ ≥ P 0 . Therefore, in both cases (A) and (B):
-If P 0 ≤ γ < P 1 and it is α * 1 = 0 and c) In the case of γ ≥ P 1 , we have:
• If α 1 = 1, the objective function is: γL + P θ P 1 L + (1 -P θ )P 0 L.
• If α 1 = 0, the objective function is: P 0 L + P θ P 1 (1 -P 0 ) L + (1 -P θ ) P 0 (1 -P 0 )L. so the optimal policy will be:
which is impossible since γ ≥ P 1 ≥ P 0 . Therefore, for both cases (A) and (B), If and . To calculate the a-priori expected expense, which is the expected result before even knowing what the prevision is for the first period, we consider L 1 = L given and Z 1 random variable. The optimal expected expense can be calculated as:
Substituting these expressions in each case and each interval, the optimal policy and the corresponding optimal value of the objective function is obtained.
